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Abstract 
In a recent article I compared the problem of theory choice, in which scientists 
must choose between competing theories, with the problem of social choice, in 
which society must choose between competing social alternatives. I argued that the 
formal machinery of social choice theory can be used to shed light on the problem 
of theory choice in science, an argument that has been criticised by Michael 
Morreau and Jacob Stegenga. This article replies to Morreau’s and Stegenga’s 
criticisms. 
 
1. Introduction 
In my article ‘Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow’, I explored 
an analogy between the problem of theory choice, in which scientists must choose 
between competing theories or hypotheses, and the problem of social choice, in 
which society must choose between competing social alternatives or ‘ways society 
might be’ (Okasha 2011). Theory choice presents a problem because there are 
multiple desiderata that we would like a theory to satisfy, e.g. fit-with-the-data and 
simplicity, which may pull in different directions, as Kuhn (1969, 1977a) famously 
argued. Social choice presents a problem because there are multiple individuals in 
society, whose preferences over the alternatives may not coincide.  
By identifying social alternatives with competing theories, and individuals 
with desiderata (or ‘criteria of theory choice’), I showed that the theory choice 
problem and the social choice problem have essentially the same structure. In each 
case the problem is one of aggregating individual rankings into an overall ranking. 
This aggregation problem has been extensively studied in social choice theory, 
which suggests using formal results from that field, such as Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem, to study the problem of theory choice in science. 
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As is well-known, Kenneth Arrow (1951) argued that any reasonable 
aggregation procedure, or ‘social choice rule’ as I called it, should satisfy four 
conditions (Universal Domain, Non-dictatorship, Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives and Weak Pareto); he then proved that these conditions cannot in fact 
be jointly satisfied, so long as the set of social alternatives contains at least three 
members. In Okasha 2011, I argued that the analogues of Arrow’s four conditions 
are reasonable requirements to impose on a theory choice rule, and thus that, prima 
facie, an impossibility theorem should hold for theory choice. This conclusion is 
puzzling, given that scientists do (apparently) manage to make all-things-
considered judgments about which of a set of competing theories is the best; and 
such judgments often appear perfectly rational. 
To resolve the puzzle, I considered a number of possible ‘escape routes’ 
from Arrow’s impossibility result. I argued that one particular escape route, 
pioneered originally by Sen (1970, 1977) in relation to social choice, is applicable 
to at least some cases of theory choice in science. Sen’s idea was to ‘enrich the 
informational basis’, by allowing as input into the social choice rule more than the 
merely ordinal rankings of alternatives, which permit no interpersonal 
comparisons, that Arrow employed. I showed how this escape route is implicit in 
two well-known approaches to theory choice in the philosophy of science 
(statistical model selection and Bayesianism), thus explaining how they avoid the 
threat of impossibility. 
Stegenga (2014) and Morreau (2014) both offer critical assessments of my 
arguments for which I am grateful. They arrive at diametrically opposite 
conclusions. Stegenga agrees with me that Arrow’s impossibility result does 
potentially apply to theory choice, but disagrees with my suggestion that 
‘enriching the informational basis’ offers a potential way out. Thus he thinks that it 
‘remains puzzling’ how rational theory choice is possible (p.??). Morreau argues, 
by contrast, that there is no threat of impossibility in the first place, since the 
analogue of Arrow’s condition U (unrestricted domain) does not apply to theory 
choice. (He argues similarly in Morreau 2013). I reply to their arguments in turn. 
 
2. Stegenga 
Before turning to Stegenga’s main criticisms of my paper, it is worth clearing up a 
number of technical errors that he has introduced into the discussion. In Part 3 of 
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his paper, Stegenga describes in his own words Sen’s ‘informational enrichment’ 
strategy for avoiding Arrovian impossibility. Sen’s key move was to use profiles 
of utility functions of the form <u1,...,un> , rather than profiles of preference 
orderings of the form <R1,...,Rn>,  as input into the aggregation rule, where ui 
denotes individual i’s utility function over the set of social alternatives in question; 
the aggregation rule is then known as ‘a social welfare functional’. Stegenga 
unhelpfully describes a utility function as an assignment of real numbers to 
‘choices’, rather than to alternatives, but this is a minor matter. 
 Less minor is Stegenga’s discussion of how, in Sen’s framework, Arrow’s 
original condition I can be decomposed into sub-components, namely 
independence of irrelevant utilities (IIU) and ordinal non-comparability of utility 
(ONC), whose conjunction is logically equivalent to Arrow’s condition I, as I 
described in my 2011 article (following Sen). Stegenga’s exposition of this 
decomposition differs from the standard one in two respects. He believes that 
ONC can be sub-divided into two further conditions (O and NC); and he 
confusingly refers to the first sub-component as ‘irrelevance of alternatives’ (IA), 
instead of IIU. Moreover, when he explains what IA says, it turns out that he is 
actually treating IA to be identical to Arrow’s condition I itself! (He writes: ‘IA 
holds that how a theory choice algorithm ranks Copernican heliocentrism to 
Ptolemaic geocentrism should only depend on how the theoretical virtues rank 
Copernican heliocentrism to Ptolemaic geocentrism’ (Stegenga 2014 p.??). So in 
Stegenga’s discussion, IA is not a ‘sub-component’ of Arrow’s independence 
condition I at all, but rather just I itself. This part of Stegenga’s discussion is 
therefore confused.  
 Moreover, Stegenga does not explain how condition ONC can be split into 
two. ONC is an invariance requirement on the social welfare functional: it says 
that given two profiles of utility functions <u1,...,un>  and  <v1,...,vn>, if each vi is a 
monotonic transformation of each ui, not necessarily the same one for each i, then 
the social welfare functional must map the two profiles onto the same ranking. (If 
‘monotonic’ were replaced with ‘positive linear’, the resulting condition would be 
cardinal non-comparability (CNC)). Stegenga asserts that it is possible to split 
ONC into two sub-conditions, O and NC, but does not provide precise 
formulations of them. I do not see that this is possible. Condition NC would 
presumably say that utility functions are not interpersonally comparable but 
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without specifying whether they are measurable on an ordinal, cardinal or some 
other scale. But how does one state this as an invariance requirement on the social 
welfare functional? Stegenga does not say. He would have done better to stick with 
Sen’s well-understood framework rather that attempting to reformulate it. 
 The underlying problem is that Stegenga seems not to understand what 
interpersonal comparability of utility means in Sen’s framework. In his Alexa and 
Beth example, he explains interpersonal comparability by saying that ‘Alexa can 
transform her utility function only exactly as Beth does, and vice versa: if Beth 
multiplies each of her utilities by 2, then Alexa must do the same’ (Stegenga 2014, 
p. ?). He then describes this as a ‘needless constraint’ on Alexa and Beth (ibid. p. 
?). This is a confusion. In Sen’s framework, interpersonal comparability of utility 
is not a constraint on the individuals, or on their utility functions, but on the 
aggregation rule. It does not say that Alexa ‘can only transform’ her utility 
function as Beth does, whatever that means. Rather it says (for the case of cardinal 
utility), that starting from a given profile of utility functions, if Alexa’s and Beth’s 
utility functions are subjected to the same positive linear transformation, then the 
resulting profile must be mapped to the same ordering of alternatives as the 
original profile. 
In section 4 of his paper, Stegenga discusses my claim that in some cases at 
least, the simplicity of a theory or hypothesis may be measurable on a stronger 
than ordinal scale. He agrees that this is so, but observes that in other cases 
simplicity is only ordinally measurable. I agree with this; indeed I said as much in 
my own paper. Stegenga adds that if theories from very different areas of science 
were being compared, e.g. Bohr’s theory of the atom with a particular statistical 
model, then ordinal comparison of their respective simplicity is likely all that could 
be achieved.
1
 This may be correct but it is of little relevance, as such theories are 
not alternatives in the first place, so the issue of choosing between them does not 
arise. 
Stegenga refers to simplicity and accuracy as ‘theoretical virtues’ rather 
than ‘criteria of theory choice’ as in my original discussion, which is harmless. 
                                                          
1
 Stegenga adds that it may ‘turn out that the ordinal comparison is a weak ordering 
or an equivalence’ (2014 p.?), which is a meaningless assertion. What he means to 
say is that the two theories may be ranked as equally simple. 
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However Stegenga introduces a terminological infelicity when he talks about the 
‘support that a given theoretical virtue provides to a theory’, and when he goes on 
to ask whether this ‘support’ is measurable on an ordinal or stronger scale. My 
original discussion made no mention of ‘support’ and simply asked whether a 
particular theoretical virtue itself, such as simplicity, is measurable on an ordinal 
or stronger scale. This is the clearest way to pose the issue.  
Stegenga rightly observes that in a given context one theoretical virtue, 
such as simplicity, may be only ordinally measurable, while another, such as fit-
with-the-data, may be measurable on a cardinal scale, for example. However he is 
too quick when he argues that in order to perform a comparison between two 
theoretical virtues (the analogue of the inter-personal comparisons of utility that 
are necessary to avoid Arrovian impossibility), they must be ‘commensurable— 
literally, they must share the same scale’ (Stegenga 2014 p. ?). This is incorrect. If 
simplicity and fit-with-the data, for example, were both measured on their own 
ratio scales, so could each be rescaled independently of each other, this 
nonetheless brings with it a certain amount of comparability (as pointed out in 
Okasha 2011, p.101). Assertions such as ‘in moving from theory T1 to T2, the 
percentage gain in simplicity is greater than the percentage loss in fit’ become 
meaningful; and so long as both measurement scales only admit non-negative 
values, this amount of comparability is sufficient to avoid Arrovian impossibility, 
as shown by Tsui and Weymark 1997.
2
 It is not necessary, in this example, that the 
two theoretical virtues be measured on the same scale. 
If different theoretical virtues are measurable on different scale types, e.g. 
ordinal and cardinal, this is analogous to some individuals having ordinal utility 
functions and others cardinal, which gives an interesting twist to the aggregation 
problem. Stegenga says he ‘knows of no work’ in social choice theory that studies 
this issue (ibid. p.??). I have encountered two papers dealing with the issue 
(Khmelnitskaya 1996, Khmelnitskaya and Weymark 2000), containing results that 
could in principle be transposed to the context of scientific theory choice. More 
work on this issue might be interesting. 
                                                          
2
  Stegenga mentions this result on p.? of his article, but wrongly attributes it to 
Sen. He does not appreciate that the result disproves his assertion about 
‘commensurability’.  
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Stegenga’s primary contention is that the comparability between theoretical 
virtues needed to avoid Arrovian impossibility will only rarely obtain, and thus 
that the ‘enriched informational basis’ escape route will only rarely be available. I 
see little real disagreement between us here. In my paper I argued that in some 
cases the Sen-style escape route does apply to theory choice while in others it does 
not. I gave two examples of theory choice rules where it does apply—Bayesianism 
and statistical model selection. Stegenga observes that these cases do not cover the 
whole of science, and that in other cases the escape route is not available. With that 
I agree; indeed it is essentially what I argued myself.  
In his discussion of the non-comparability of the different theoretical 
virtues, Stegenga conflates two issues. In Okasha 2011, I observed that in 
statistical inference, a common measure of how well a theory fits the data is the 
‘sum of squares’ (SOS) score, in which case the criterion ‘fit-with-the-data’ 
becomes measurable on the same scale-type as the dependent variable on the 
regression plot. Stegenga says that the SOS measure is ‘entirely conventional’ 
(ibid. p.??). This is something of an exaggeration (the SOS measure has many 
desirable properties), but it is true that other measures of fit exist, which need not 
be ordinally equivalent to the SOS score. However this point—that ‘fit-with-the-
data’ may be measured in different ways—has nothing to do with the main point in 
Stegenga’s paragraph, which is that, however it is measured, the permissible 
transformations of the fit-with-the-data scale are independent of the permissible 
transformations of the scales on which the other theoretical virtues are measured. 
This last point is correct, and is something I myself stressed; but it does not 
necessarily block the Sen-style escape route, for reasons given in my original paper 
and partly recapitulated three paragraphs back. 
In Okasha 2011, I showed how the orthodox Bayesian approach to theory 
choice may be subsumed within a social choice-theoretic framework. There are 
two criteria of theory choice (or ‘theoretical virtues’), prior probability P(Ti) and 
likelihood P(E/Ti), both of which are represented by real-valued functions on the 
theories {T1,...,Tn} that we wish to choose between, for a given body of evidence 
E. The Bayesian theory choice functional (the ‘BCF’ of my 2011 paper) then 
generates an overall ranking of the theories according to the value of the product 
[P(Ti) x P(E/Ti)]. This theory choice rule satisfies the analogues of Arrow’s non-
domain axioms in the Sen-style framework, as I showed. Since probabilities are 
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measured on an absolute scale (or if one regards the assignment of probability one 
to the certain event as conventional, on a ratio scale), the input to the theory choice 
rule contains of much more than merely ordinal non-comparable rankings. This 
neatly illustrates how Sen’s escape route—enriching the informational basis—
applies to theory choice. 
 Stegenga objects to this argument on the grounds that ‘the Kuhnian 
theoretical virtues that Okasha began with...do not appear in his discussion of 
Bayesianism’ (ibid p.??). He observes that Kuhn’s criteria, such as simplicity and 
fruitfulness, are plausibly regarded as relevant to the determination of the prior 
probabilities that the Bayesian starts with. This is no doubt correct, but Stegenga’s 
criticism is misplaced. As I made clear in my 2011 paper, my real interest was not 
so much in assessing Kuhn’s own account of theory choice, which is rather 
idiosyncratic, but rather in the more general idea that theory choice in science is 
based on multiple criteria that may pull in different directions. As I observed, this 
latter idea is common to diverse philosophical approaches to scientific inference, 
including Bayesianism, inference to the best explanation, and statistical model 
selection, so is not specific to Kuhn. My point in discussing the Bayesian approach 
was not to endorse it, but rather to give a concrete illustration of how the 
informational enrichment strategy permits an escape from Arrovian impossibility. 
To criticise my discussion of Bayesianism on the grounds that it is not framed in 
terms of Kuhn’s own criteria thus misses the dialectical point. 
 
3. Morreau 
Morreau (2014) applauds the general idea that scientific theory choice may 
profitably be compared with social choice and formalized similarly. However he 
argues that the two cases are not exactly analogous, and that no Arrow-style 
impossibility result threatens theory choice since Arrow’s condition U 
(unrestricted domain) is inapplicable. Thus even if the input to theory choice rule 
consists solely of ordinal rankings, i.e. without informational enrichment, there is 
no threat of impossibility, Morreau argues. 
 In social choice, condition U says that the domain of the social choice rule 
is the set of all possible profiles of preference orders over the alternatives—the 
universal domain. This means that there are no a priori restrictions on the 
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preferences that individuals are allowed to have: whatever their preferences, the 
social choice rule is required to output an overall ranking of the alternatives. 
 As Morreau notes, one of Arrow’s original motivations for U was 
epistemic: we may want to design an aggregation procedure before we know what 
the actual preference profile is. Thus in an election, the rule for combining the 
voters’ rankings of the candidates into an overall ranking should ideally be 
specified before the ballot opens, and thus before the actual preference profile is 
known. A different motivation for considering multiple preference profiles was 
given by Kolm (1996, 1997). He argues that even if the actual preference profile is 
known, to justify making a given social choice on the basis of this profile requires 
considering what social choice would have been made had the actual preference 
profile been different. So it is essential that the domain of the social choice rule 
contain multiple profiles.
3
 
 Whatever its justification, condition U evidently presupposes that the 
individuals in society could have had preferences different from the ones they 
actually do have. This seems unproblematic, at least in most cases. Suppose that 
three candidates are contesting a U.K. election, one from each of the main parties. 
One of the electors, an elderly man called Bob, has the following preference order: 
Labour ≻ Lib. Dem. ≻ Tory. It seems entirely conceivable that Bob could have 
had a different preference order. Bob might have undergone a rightwards shift in 
middle age and had exactly the opposite preferences. Or he might have long since 
tired of party politics and been indifferent among the three candidates. The same 
applies to the other electors too; so any profile of preference orders is possible. It is 
thus perfectly coherent, conceptually, to impose condition U on the aggregation 
rule in paradigmatic social choice problems. 
 Morreau argues that matters stand different with theory choice. He argues 
that some criteria of theory choice, such as simplicity, are ‘rigid’. Suppose that 
theory T1 is simpler than T2 (by whatever yardstick of simplicity we are using). 
This fact could not have been otherwise, Morreau argues: there is no way that 
theory T2 could have been simpler than T1. Morreau’s reason (in effect) is that the 
simplicity of a theory is an essential rather than an accidental property of it; and 
thus the relative simplicity of two theories is an essential property of the pair. For a 
                                                          
3
 See Weymark 2011 for useful discussion of Kolm’s ideas. 
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given set of theories, there is only one possible way that they could have been 
ordered in terms of simplicity, namely the actual way. Therefore condition U is 
inapplicable, Morreau argues. It is unreasonable to demand that a theory choice 
rule be able to handle profiles that cannot possibly arise. 
 Morreau does not hold that all criteria of theory choice are rigid. He 
explicitly allows that ‘accuracy’ (or ‘fit-with-the-data’) is not rigid. Theory T1 may 
fit the actual empirical data better than T2, but had the data been different the 
reverse might have been true. So for a given set of theories, any possible ordering 
of those theories in terms of fit-with-the-data is conceivable. Thus it makes good 
sense to allow the domain of a theory choice rule to include profiles that order the 
theories by ‘fit-with-the-data’ in all possible ways. For as Morreau observes, we 
would ideally want our theory choice rule to be specified before the empirical data 
come in, and thus before we know what the ‘fit-with-the-data’ ordering is. 
 Morreau thus allows that the domain of a theory choice rule should contain 
multiple profiles; but he insists that the analogue of Arrow’s condition U is too 
strong, since the rigidity of criteria such as ‘simplicity’ means that some profiles 
represent metaphysical impossibilities. Since Arrow derived his impossibility 
result with the help of condition U, Morreau concludes that no analogous result 
applies to theory choice: Arrow’s theorem ‘tells us precisely nothing’ about the 
possibility of combining different criteria into a theory choice rule, he says 
(Morreau 2014, p.??).  
 Morreau’s argument raises three issues. Firstly, are his claims about 
rigidity correct? Secondly, if so, does it follow that condition U is inapplicable to 
theory choice? Thirdly, if condition U is inapplicable, what are the implications for 
the rationality of theory choice? I address these issues in turn. 
 Morreau’s claim that ‘simplicity’ is rigid seems quite right, at first blush. 
He argues that if Copernicus’s theory was computationally simpler than Ptolemy’s, 
then this could not have been otherwise; and if a particular statistical model 
contains fewer free parameters than another (so is simpler in that sense), this too 
could not have been otherwise. However there are potential counters to these 
claims. 
 Morreau’s claims about rigidity are based on modal intuitions about how 
the essence / accident distinction applies to theories. Like any object, a scientific 
theory can presumably undergo some changes while retaining its identity. If 
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Newton had formulated his theory of gravity slightly differently, e.g. using a 
different calculus notation, it would still have been the same theory, intuitively. It 
may be difficult to say exactly which changes Newton’s theory can undergo 
without ceasing to be the same theory. Had he proposed an inverse cube law this 
would presumably have been a different theory, not a variant of the same theory, 
but where do we draw the line? As for concrete objects, the essence / accident 
distinction is not easy to apply to scientific theories. 
 An interesting discussion of this point was offered by David Hull (1988), 
who argued that historical descent, rather than intrinsic properties, provides the key 
to individuating a scientific theory. Thus ‘Darwinian theory’, to use Hull’s 
favourite example, denotes a lineage of ideas beginning with Darwin; these ideas 
may not share an intrinsic essence, but are united by descent. If this is correct, then 
the changes that a scientific theory, e.g. Copernicus’s, can undergo while retaining 
its identity are presumably considerable. Whether these changes are sufficiently 
great so that the relative simplicity of Copernicus’s and Ptolemy’s theories could 
have been inverted I do not know; but the issue seems to me less clear-cut than 
Morreau assumes. (Note also that some philosophers regard appeals to simplicity 
in science as stemming from background empirical assumptions, rather than 
referring to intrinsic features of the theories themselves; this is argued persuasively 
by Sober 1988). 
 Despite the difficulties with individuating scientific theories, I am inclined 
to agree with Morreau’s claim that some criteria of theory choice, such as 
simplicity, are rigid, as I largely share his modal intuitions. So let us grant this 
point. Does it follow that Arrow’s condition U (unrestricted domain) is 
inapplicable to theory choice? Morreau seems on strong ground here. If the relative 
simplicity of Copernicus’s and Ptolemy’s theories could not have been other that it 
is, surely we should not require of a theory choice rule that it accept as input 
profiles in which the simplicity ordering of these two theories is different from the 
actual one, as ex hypothesi they cannot arise? 
 In arguing this point Morreau stresses that in standard Arrovian social 
choice theory there is a fixed set of individuals and a fixed set of alternatives; the 
different profiles in the domain are different possible orderings by the individuals 
of the alternatives. The individuals and the social alternatives do not vary across 
profiles. The same should apply to theory choice, if it is to be modelled on social 
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choice. Thus if the set of alternatives includes theories T1 and T2, and if T1 is in fact 
simpler than T2, then any profile in the domain in which T2 occurs higher up the 
simplicity ordering than T1 describes a hypothetical scenario in which T2 itself is 
simpler than T1 itself; not a scenario in which some other pair of theories are so 
related. Morreau is right to stress this point, which I admit I overlooked when I 
argued that condition U as applied to theory choice is unexceptionable. This is a 
well-taken criticism. 
 One possible response might be to construe the ‘alternatives’ as abstract 
labels, denoting items whose identity is not necessarily fixed as we move from 
profile to profile. In social choice terms, this would be to suggest that the different 
profiles in the domain refer to patterns of preferences that the individuals might 
have had over different items bearing the same ‘labels’. This suggestion has 
occasionally been mooted in the social choice literature, precisely to avoid the type 
of objection that Morreau is making, for example by Blackorby, Donaldson and 
Bossert (2006 p. 281). However in a recent paper, which complements his reply to 
my article, Morreau (2013) is sharply critical of treating the alternatives as ‘labels’, 
arguing that this constitutes a serious modification of the standard social choice 
framework and is a recipe for confusion. I agree with this assessment.  
 Let us grant then that some criteria for theory choice are rigid, and that 
Arrow’s condition U as applied to theory choice is inappropriate. What follows? 
Morreau concludes that Arrow’s theorem does not apply to theory choice, so there 
is no threat to the rationality of science. Because of rigidity, and the consequent 
inapplicability of condition U, Arrow’s theorem ‘gets no grip’ he argues (ibid. p. 
??), and so the ‘impossibility scare’ can be seen off (ibid. p. ??) . However this is 
too quick. 
 As is well-known, Arrow’s condition U is actually much stronger than is 
needed to derive his impossibility result. Since the late 1970s, an extensive 
research program has investigated whether an impossibility result can be derived 
with weaker domain assumptions; the answer turns out to be yes.
4
 Central to this 
literature is the notion of an ‘Arrow-inconsistent domain’, which refers to any 
subset of the universal domain on which Arrow’s axioms N, P, and I are jointly 
unsatisfiable. (Recall that the universal domain is the set of all profiles of 
                                                          
4
 See Gaertner 2001 or Le Breton and Weymark 2011 for overviews of this work. 
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preference orders over the alternatives.) We know from Arrow’s own work that the 
universal domain itself is Arrow-inconsistent, but so too are many proper subsets 
of the universal domain. Thus one cannot argue that because condition U is 
inapplicable in a certain circumstance, that the threat of impossibility is thereby 
eliminated.  
 How does this bear on the theory choice case? To sharpen the issue, 
suppose we have a finite set of alternative theories {T1,…,Tn}. Let R be the set of 
all orderings of these n theories. To keep things tractable, suppose we are using 
just two criteria of theory choice: simplicity and accuracy; this involves no serious 
loss of generality. Let us assume with Morreau that simplicity is rigid. Let Rs  R 
denote the sole admissible simplicity ordering. We agree that accuracy is 
completely non-rigid; so all elements of R represent admissible accuracy orderings. 
The domain of the theory choice rule is therefore the Cartesian product Rs x R, 
which is a proper subset of the universal domain R
2
. We know that R
2
 is Arrow-
inconsistent, but what about Rs x R? That is the crucial question. 
 I do not know the answer to this question; so far as I am aware this case is 
not covered by any of the extant theorems on domain-restriction in social choice.
5
 
Morreau’s paper does not answer the question either. So when he says, in relation 
to my statistical model selection example (which precisely involves two criteria, 
accuracy and simplicity, one of which is rigid and the other not), that ‘certainly 
Arrow’s theorem doesn’t limit the possibilities for choosing among models in this 
example’ (ibid. p.??), this is rather misleading. In the absence of a proof that the 
domain Rs x R is Arrow-consistent, the right conclusion to draw is that we do not 
know whether an Arrovian impossibility result applies in this case or not. There is 
an unresolved mathematical question here.
6
 So while Morreau’s assertion may be 
                                                          
5
 Most theorems in this literature identify only sufficient conditions for a domain to 
be Arrow-inconsistent, and / or operate with so-called ‘economic domains’ which 
contain more structure than the abstract sets of alternatives that Arrow worked 
with, and / or require that the admissible preference orderings for each individual 
be the same. See Gaertner 2001 or Le Breton and Weymark 2011. 
6
 John Weymark (personal communication), building on a suggestion of Wulf 
Gaertner, has partially resolved this question. He has shown by example that in the 
special case where both criteria strictly order the alternative theories, the domain Rs 
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literally true, in that Arrow’s original theorem (which used condition U) does not 
apply, the real question is whether an Arrow-style theorem with a weaker domain 
assumption applies, and this has not been settled. 
This brings me to my only real complaint with Morreau’s paper, which is 
that in a number of places he implies that theory choice faces no threat of 
impossibility on the grounds that condition U does not apply.  (For example, he 
says that the analogy with social choice ‘looks harmless’ for the rationality of 
science (p.??) and that his analysis has put ‘the impossibility scare safely behind 
us’ (p.??).) This may be true, but Morreau has not shown it. To do so, he would 
need to show that with the appropriate domain assumption, e.g. Rs x R in the 
example above, there exist theory choice rules that satisfy conditions N, P and I. 
One way to show this would be to provide an example of a theory choice rule that 
satisfies these conditions on the domain in question. Morreau does not do this, so 
his confidence that the threat of impossibility has been allayed is misplaced. It 
remains open whether an impossibility result holds for theory choice or not, even 
granting Morreau his points about rigidity and domain restriction. 
To be fair to Morreau, he is well aware that condition U is stronger than 
needed to derive Arrow’s result, and indeed says so explicitly on page ? of his 
paper. Moreover he adds, in a footnote, that it is an ‘open question’ whether with 
some rigid criteria, the domain of the theory choice rule will still contain diverse 
enough profiles to allow an Arrow-style impossibility result to go through (p. ?, fn 
12). This is exactly right. But given that the question is open, Morreau is not 
entitled to suggest that his analysis ‘vindicates Kuhn’ as per his title, nor that he 
has put the impossibility scare behind us. A successful vindication of Kuhn, that is, 
of Kuhn’s claim that there are many acceptable algorithms for theory choice, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
x R is Arrow-consistent. However Weymark also shows that in this special case, for 
any triple of alternatives there is at least one pair on which one of the criteria is a 
dictator, i.e. the overall choice for that pair is determined by a single criterion. 
Though not as bad as Arrovian dictatorship, this is nonetheless an undesirable 
feature. For details of Weymark’s example and proof, please contact the author.  
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would at the very least have to show that the typical domain for theory choice is 
Arrow-consistent, which Morreau does not do.  
This complaint is relevant to Morreau’s critique of the ‘informational 
enrichment’ escape route as applied to my statistical model selection example. In 
that example, I identified a domain restriction that arises because one criterion 
(accuracy) can only take negative values, while the other (simplicity) can only take 
positive integer values. I claimed that this domain restriction alone does not suffice 
to alleviate Arrovian impossibility, and sketched a proof.
7
 Morreau agrees that this 
is so, writing ‘Okasha’s mild domain restriction is not crucial....it by itself will not 
alleviate the Arrow impossibility’ (ibid p. ?). He continues ‘but there is another 
domain restriction in force as well’, that arises because simplicity is rigid. Morreau 
here creates the impression that this additional domain restriction is crucial, and 
does block the impossibility. This may be so; but it is a conjecture, not something 
that he has shown. 
Note also that Morreau’s critique of my use of Arrow’s framework to 
model scientific theory choice does not apply to my Bayesian example. (This 
example is briefly described above in my response to Stegenga). In this case the 
two criteria—prior probability and likelihood—are not rigid. Clearly, a given set of 
theories could be ordered by prior probability in any way, at least on a subjective 
interpretation of probability
8
; and the same is true of the likelihood ordering, given 
that the empirical data might have been different. So in this case, the theory choice 
rule (the Bayesian theory choice functional) is able to avoid impossibility not 
because of domain restriction but because of informational enrichment, as proved 
in the Appendix to my original article. 
 To conclude, Morreau, Stegenga and I agree that scientists do choose 
between rival theories based on how those theories score against multiple criteria, 
and seem able to do this in a rational way. Given Arrow’s theorem, a question 
                                                          
7
 More accurately, I provided a full proof of the analogous claim in relation to my 
Bayesian example, and argued that a similar proof could be given for the statistical 
model selection case. See Okasha 2011 p. 100, fn. 22, and Appendix. 
8
 Here I assume that none of the theories logically implies any of the others. This is 
reasonable as otherwise the theories would not constitute genuine alternatives in the 
first place. 
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arises as to how this could be. There are a number of possible explanations. One is 
that theory choice in science is often binary, i.e. the choice is between a pair of 
theories. Another is informational enrichment: the input to the theory choice rule 
may consist of more than merely ordinal non-comparable rankings. Another is 
domain restriction: the appropriate domain of the theory choice rule may be 
sufficiently small to be Arrow-consistent (as Morreau hopes). It would be a 
mistake, in my view, to insist that any one of these explanations provides the full 
resolution of the puzzle. There may be an element of truth in each of them.
9
 
 
 
  
                                                          
9 Thanks to Michael Morreau, Kit Patrick, Wulf Gaertner, and John Weymark for discussion 
and email correspondence. This work was supported by the European Research Council 
Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007–2013), ERC Grant agreement no. 295449. 
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